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Abstract
This paper briefly compares two research traditions: empiricism and generative mecha-
nisms. Moreover, it briefly recalls the arguments of empiricist epistemology and its philo-
sophical justification, whose paradigmatic expression is positivism. The paper then exam-
ines the criticisms that have been addressed against this trend and sets out the principles of 
the generative mechanisms strategy in sociology by focusing on several studies by Boudon 
which are the most representative of this methodological orientation.
Keywords: empiricism; epistemology; causal explanation; rationality. 
Resumen. Del positivismo a los mecanismos generativos: el programa de investigación pionero 
de Raymond Boudon
Este artículo compara brevemente dos tradiciones de investigación: la del empirismo y la 
de los mecanismos generativos. Además, recuerda también brevemente los argumentos del 
empirismo epistemológico y su justificación filosófica, cuya expresión paradigmática es el 
positivismo. El artículo examina, pues, las críticas que se han dirigido contra esta tradición 
y expone los principios de la estrategia de los mecanismos generativos en sociología limi-
tándose a las investigaciones de Boudon, que son las más representativas de esta orientación 
metodológica. 
Palabras clave: empirismo; epistemología; explicación causal; racionalidad.
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1. Introduction
The idea that a phenomenon is explained by constructing basic mechanisms 
that generate it is certainly not new. It can be traced back to Greek philoso-
phers. However, it is only very recently that it has become a research strategy. 
By abandoning the classifications of natural history and by seeking to unders-
tand the causes of the invariance of certain characteristics of life or those viral 
or microbial causes responsible for particular diseases, biology was one of the 
early first sciences to implement the principles of the new methodology.
Breaking with the empiricist approach inherited from an interpretation 
of the natural philosophy of Newton, physics has been involved in the same 
way. Taxonomy remained nevertheless dominant but not exclusive in linguis-
tics until recently. It is helpful to recall that formalist theoreticians, Chomsky 
(1964) for example, have played a critical role in the emergence of the gene-
rative approach. In sociology, systematisation and codification of generative 
mechanisms methodology took place later. The first attempt by Simon (1952, 
1955) hardly had any influence on the sociological community. It is only with 
the seminal works of Boudon as well as Fararo (1969a, 1969b, 1989) that this 
research strategy began to be viewed as distinctive and its fruitfulness recognised.
In this contribution, I shall briefly compare the two research traditions. 
Moreover, without claiming to identify all the reasons that explain the almost 
exclusive dominance of empiricist methodology, I shall briefly recall the argu-
ments of its epistemological and philosophical justification, whose strongest 
expression is positivism. I shall then examine the criticisms that have been 
directed at it and set out the principles of the strategy of generating models 
in sociology limiting myself to Boudon’s research studies that are the most 
representative of this methodological orientation.
2. Why has empiricist epistemology been dominant?
According to the positivist programme, which had and still has a great influen-
ce on sociology, social phenomena are explained when correlations are identi-
fied by empirical analyses of functional relationships between variables. Why 
has such a methodological approach been dominant in social sciences? There 
are, I think, four reasons, namely the social demand for “cameral sciences” – 
following Schumpeter’s phrase – that is, action-oriented sciences, the growing 
power of statistical techniques and computer technology, the institutional and 
social prestige of quantitative sociology, and finally, the intellectual comfort 
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that this approach provides. It is possible to identify the epistemological prin-
ciples of such a mode of explaining social phenomena by studying the philo-
sophical foundations upon which most current empirical research studies are 
based. However, one can reach the same objective by analysing the formal 
discourse of the sociological method, which has been historically the expression 
and justification of this strategy.
Empirical sociology today is the true forerunner of the nineteenth-century 
emerging sociology. It has been the result of a triple tradition, namely Comte’s 
positivism, moral statistics and epistemological empiricism dominant in all 
sciences at the beginning of this century. There are surely some divergences 
between the protagonists of these three movements, but they actually share 
the same conception of this new science of society they aspired to create. If, 
for example, Quételet and moral statisticians on the one hand, and Comte and 
the positivist school on the other hand, did not agree on the use of probability 
theory in social sciences, they shared the same epistemological principles of 
empirical scientism that dominated science since the victory of Newtonian 
physics, or – to be more accurate – since the philosophical interpretation that 
most philosophers have given of this science. There are four principles:
I) According to the first principle, science must reject metaphysics and 
separate the empirical data from any ontology. Human beings and social phe-
nomena are therefore “naturalised” in order to be subjected to scientific inves-
tigation, namely to observations, indirect experiments, and historical method 
according to Auguste Comte, and to measure according to Quételet and moral 
statisticians.
II) According to the second principle, the ultimate goal of scientific study 
is to demonstrate that phenomena comply with laws. Ideally, any explanation 
is supposed to be reduced to a mathematical function. Here, I would like to 
quote one of the most eloquent positivist texts borrowed from the Course of 
Positive Philosophy1: 
In the final, the positive state, the mind has given over the vain search after 
absolute notions, the origin and destination of the universe, and the coituses of 
phenomena, and applies itself to the study of their laws, that is, their invaria-
ble relations of succession and resemblance. Reasoning and observation, duly 
combined, are the means of this knowledge. What is now understood when 
we speak of an explanation of facts is simply the establishment of a connec-
tion between single phenomena and some general facts, the number of which 
continually diminishes with the progress of science. 
This extract from the first lesson of the Course of Positive Philosophy meets 
the famous introduction of Sur l’homme et le développement de ses facultés (On Man 
and the Development of his Faculties) where Quételet explains his conception 
of naturalistic laws and macro-social regularities.
1. In this paper all translations are mine.
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III) For the third principle, the rejection of any metaphysics banishes any 
scientific research into the realm of causes or generating mechanisms of phe-
nomena. This is a leitmotif in the Course of Positive Philosophy.
We shall admit, in physics, as a fundamental principle of the true theory of 
the institution of the assumptions, that any scientific hypothesis to be really 
tested (French text says “judgeable”) should exclusively focus on the laws of 
phenomena and never on their modes of production. 
Pierre Duhem (1906: 26), who influenced not only the Vienna Circle, but 
also all the twentieth-century positivists, is the heir of Comte’s thought when 
he defines physical theory as follows: “a physical theory is not an explanation. 
It is a system of mathematical propositions, deduced from a small number of 
principles, which aims to represent as simply as completely, and as accurately 
as possible a set of experimental laws.”
Later, Paul Samuelson (1964) says nothing else when he replies to Machlup 
(1964): “Scientists never ‘explain’ any behavior by theory or by any other hook. 
Every description that is superseded by a “deeper explanation” turns out upon 
careful examination to have been replaced by still another description.”
For the father of positivism, Newton was right to limit his search to stating 
laws and not trying to explain, while Descartes was wrong in pretending to go 
further by offering accountability of laws by the swirls hypothesis. Who was 
really right, Descartes or Newton? For those who seek to predict, compute and 
act, specifically for Comte and the positivists, the English scientist approach is 
the right one. For those who want to understand the mechanism of movement, 
for example, Newton’s theory is not satisfactory, and Descartes has at least the 
merit of having tried to decipher the puzzle in the second book of his Principles 
of Philosophy even if his explanation is laughable.
Quételet does not say anything else: he denies being a theorist, he rejects 
any system, and he voluntarily limits his search to the facts and to the study 
of their patterns.
In the eyes of positivist and social statisticians, as in the eyes of all those 
who were frightened by the rise of the “dangerous classes” and their “social 
harms,” it is absurd to try to explain and understand phenomena with theo-
ries based on the rationality assumption as the Enlightenment philosophers 
wanted. The rational man of the eighteenth century belongs to the elite that 
are able to calculate probabilities, while the average man does not have this 
distinctive feature. During the Enlightenment, moral sciences endeavoured to 
reveal the rational foundations of action and belief. For them, society was also 
governed by laws insofar as it is an aggregation of rational individuals. In the 
nineteenth century on the other hand, social sciences sought to highlight social 
patterns and abandon the microscopic level of individual action. For them, 
society was governed by laws despite the irrationality of its members. It is well 
known that the theme of the irrationality of crowds and of the individual is 
commonplace in the nineteenth-century sociological literature.
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More than that: even the use of assumptions, which are regarded merely 
as artifacts, is strictly prohibited. Auguste Comte distinguishes two kinds of 
assumptions. The first one, which is legitimate and authorised, concerns the 
analysis of phenomena in order to discover their laws. The second one, which 
is prohibited, is related to the nature, the cause or the mode of production 
of phenomena. The conclusion of the basic theory of assumptions developed 
in the twenty-eighth lesson of the Course of Positive Philosophy is that “any 
scientific hypothesis to be really subject to judgment should exclusively focus 
on the laws of phenomena and never on their modes of production”. Quite 
obviously, the founder of positivism shares the empiricist interpretation of 
Newton’s natural philosophy, which makes the English physicist a positivist 
avant la lettre. In fact, for the empiricists, the famous aphorism “hypotheses non 
fingo” is a profession of faith according to which Newton would have declared 
unlawful the search for explanations by hypothesis. Actually, the famous adage 
is taken from a passage of the Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy 
where Newton recognised that he was unable to find a hypothesis that could 
explain the properties of gravity. He therefore knew that gravitation requires 
an explanation, that is to say, something that goes beyond the law.
IV) According to the fourth principle, action is the ultimate goal of scien-
ces, including social sciences. On this point, there is a consensus between 
Saint Simon, social reformers, Comte and Quételet who are the heirs of the 
French Idéologues. However, the action depends on the forecast that rests on 
the knowledge of the laws governing phenomena.
At the turn of the nineteenth century, some biologists and physicists broke 
with the traditional research programme corresponding to the macroscopic 
approach of Newtonian astronomy and physics. They developed a new para-
digm consistent with new theories (e.g. viral, genetic, particle), and the pro-
blems posed by the micro-physical phenomena.
Claude Bernard is undoubtedly one of the first scientists to have unders-
tood the limits of empiricism and positivism, which were dominant in the 
late nineteenth century. In his Introduction to Experimental Medicine and in 
his Principles of Experimental Medicine, he opposed the empiricist doctor of 
the Hippocratic School to which the positivists belonged, and the experimen-
talist physician he represents himself. While the first observes and describes; 
the second leads experimentations, that is to say experiences brought about 
according to theoretical assumptions. If the empiricist relies on the statistical 
relationship between treatments and diseases, he is however unable to answer 
the question of why the administration of such pharmacopoeia has an effect 
on this particular disease. 
“Empiricism stops science and dulls the mind, when one rests on it,” Ber-
nard (1947: 75) says. “The empiricist is satisfied when he manages to heal. The 
experimental doctor wants to go further and to penetrate with experimentation 
by explaining the vital mechanisms. The real goal of the researcher is to know 
and understand the generative mechanisms of the disease or, in the words of 
Claude Bernard (1947: 137), “the mechanism producing disease.”
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One perceives a similar attitude in physics at the beginning of the twentieth 
century that Emile Meyerson (1921: 62) admirably summed up: 
Just have a look at the collection published by the Council (the Brussels Con-
gress of Physics in 1911) that reflects the communications that have been 
presented  and the discussions they provoked, to find that the sole purpose of 
all this work was the search for a true physical theory, an assumption on the 
mode of production (so odious to Auguste Comte and inadmissible, indeed, 
according to his conception of science).
The strength of positivism is largely due to the belief according to which 
it is a philosophy that expresses, founds and justifies the new science. In its 
various forms, positivism was a philosophy of the nineteenth-century scholar. 
But it sometimes continues to play the same role today. As a research strategy 
seeking to explain nomologically and providing psychological satisfaction with 
a minimum intellectual investment, positivism is ineradicable because it is a 
lifeline to which clings the researcher who is often unable to speculate on the 
generative mechanisms of phenomena. At times, it happens we are positivist, 
and at times we reject positivism.
In the nineteenth century, few people understood the negative consequen-
ces of these epistemological principles and attempted to replace them with 
others. In his Rules of the sociological method, Durkheim (1895) remained a 
prisoner of the positivist dogma. However, in his research studies, the author 
of Suicide and The Elementary Forms of Religious Life tried to break with certain 
principles of positivist philosophy by demonstrating the inadequacy of nomo-
logical activity and the need to explain the laws themselves. It has been shown 
(Boudon, 1990, 1998b; Cherkaoui, 1997, 1998, 2008) that a sketch of a new 
strategy based on the search of the modes of production of social phenomena 
can be found in the work of the French sociologist that he neither developed 
nor systematised. It should be added that no one has been able to achieve this 
programme, even the most anti-positivist sociologist of his generation, namely 
Gabriel Tarde.
Let us now turn to contemporary sociology. Many research studies belong 
partly to the empiricist tradition. The methodology of multivariate analyses of 
large-scale quantitative data is based on the principles of the positivist model. 
This is the case of the work of Stouffer, Lazarsfeld and the Columbia school 
although some of them, including Lazarsfeld and Merton, expressed dissatis-
faction here and there with the nomological explanation and tried to formulate 
hypotheses whose kinship with generative models is obvious. However, such 
assumptions remain ad hoc and ex post.
3. Boudon’s new research strategy
In the 1960s, a new research programme in sociology appeared simultaneously 
and independently in Boudon’s and Fararo’s works, to mention only the most 
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representative work of this new trend which broke with the positivist model 
and its nomological explanation. The mode of explanation of this new strategy 
was to highlight the mechanisms that generate regularities of phenomena in a 
way identical to biology, physics or linguistics.
The merit of Boudon is to have clarified the principles of such a strategy, 
and to have tested them in such a vital domain as the sociology of mobility 
and social inequalities, proving their fruitfulness, and expanding their fields 
of application. He clearly saw their links with the paradigm of methodological 
individualism and the general theory of rationality, both of which he devoted 
the rest of his intellectual life to (Boudon 2009, 2010). It is noticeable that, at 
the same time, and obviously independently, Harré (1970) proposed a realistic 
philosophy advocating the same perspective.
The idea of  explaining by social mechanisms runs through the work of 
Tocqueville, Durkheim, Simmel, Weber, or Merton (Cherkaoui, 2005), but 
in none of them was it recognised, developed and applied to such wide areas 
as did Boudon, Fararo, Simon (1952, 1955, 1968) or later Schelling (1978). 
Moreover, in the early 1970s, Boudon’s approach was so unusual that even 
such acute minds as Hauser (1974) had trouble in understanding it. His critical 
review of Boudon’s Opportunity and Social Inequality was evidence of a deep 
and symptomatic misunderstanding: there is indeed a dichotomy between the 
positivist empiricism that dominated research on mobility in particular and 
sociology in general, and the new research programme proposed by Boudon.
A quick examination of the development and directions displayed in 
Boudon’s work offer a division of his oeuvre into three stages. The first period 
is dominated by contributions to the construction of statistical and mathema-
tical models in the tradition of his friend Lazarsfeld (Boudon, 1967). A second 
period covers the late 1960s and 1970s up to the publication of La place du 
désordre in 1984 (translated in Theories of social change, 1986). It is characteri-
sed by the first version of the theory of rationality applied to social mobility, 
inequality and change. The third period has been marked by his efforts to 
generalise his theory and extend it to the most various topics and issues, such 
as ideological, scientific, and religious beliefs (Boudon, 1999, 2009, 2011).
It would not be difficult to point out the change of direction in Boudon’s 
sociological work that first became evident at the end of the 1960s. He moved 
away from the studies whose main inspiration was the Lazarsfeldian tradition 
to a novel form of sociology whose primary concern was the construction of 
a new strategy based on the discovery of generative mechanisms; an approach 
systematised in Boudon (1973) L’inégalité des chances (translated in Education, 
Opportunity and Social Inequality, 1974), but actually visible in two articles 
written in the late sixties and published in the European journal Quality and 
Quantity, with the significant titles “Essai sur la mobilité sociale en Utopie” 
(Essay on social mobility in utopia) and “Éléments pour une théorie formelle 
de la mobilité sociale” (Elements for a formal theory of social mobility). In 
fact, this innovation was not an ex nihilo creation. Boudon had been for some 
time seeking a new methodology that could allow sociology to get out of the 
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rut in which it was stuck. In fact, in the article “La statistique psychologique 
de Tarde” which appeared in 1964, the premises of the new methodologi-
cal orientation were revealed. Another article published in the same year by 
Boudon (1964b) with an even more suggestive title “Les mécanismes sociaux 
des abandons de poursuite” (Social mechanisms of prosecution dropouts) pro-
vides a still better example of how the new methodology could be applied to 
a specific area.
Boudon’s methodology rests on five principles of analysis that will inform 
his later work. Firstly, he refuses to consider the correlation analysis or any 
standard statistical technique as an explanatory mode of phenomena. Secondly, 
he regards as impossible or at least highly difficult to draw any reliable con-
clusions from a direct reading of data tables since any table is only a provisio-
nal stage that is unable to express correctly the social process that generates 
it. Thirdly, for him sociological phenomenon is the result of complex social 
processes which require the use of longitudinal analyses. Fourthly, macro-
phenomena are the results of behaviours of partially autonomous social actors 
and their interaction structure (independence or interdependence). Finally, 
it seems necessary to build psychological and cognitive models to understand 
these behaviours.
Let us examine some significant aspects of Boudon’s interpretation of 
Tarde’s criminal studies. Tarde, he notes, is less interested in the explanation of 
crime but focuses on that of mechanisms of repression. For him, the statistical 
series to be explained are the joint product of an act, crime, and the judiciary 
institution. This judiciary may “class” without result, suppress or discharge. 
The statistical regularities are largely the product of judicial treatment. Howe-
ver, these macro-patterns are the result of interactions between actors with 
specific social roles and that mutually influence each other. To understand the 
functioning of judicial institutions, it is necessary to distinguish two sets of 
actors. The first, the magistrates, is characterised by interaction or reciprocal 
influences. The defendants and juries, who form the second set of actors, do 
not interact with each other. This distinction helps to explain the differences 
between some longitudinal data series: on the one hand, the proportion of 
prisoners who appeal the decision of criminal courts remain stable over time, 
while the proportion of appeals by the prosecution decreases during the same 
period. In the first case, the actors’ independence explains the stability, while 
the interdependence between judges who monitor each other and anticipate 
their respective decisions accounts for the decline.
4. On phenomenalism and its critique
The positivist explains by establishing laws that he seeks to derive from other 
more general laws and so on. In its simplest form, the lawful relation is an 
expression, often mathematical, between at least two phenomena such as dis-
tance and time in Galileo-Descartes’s law of falling bodies, or suicide and 
marital status in Durkheim’s (1897) theory of integration. These relations are 
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empirical generalisations or laws with limited validity. The positivist explains 
the law of falling bodies by deriving it from Newton’s laws of gravitation and 
motion. But sometimes he will face problems that cannot be solved in the 
context of his epistemology. To solve them, he will therefore be condemned 
to violate some of his principles. Let us limit ourselves to the following socio-
logical examples.
Suppose we study the relationship between two variables X and Y. Assume 
that a correlation between the two variables is deduced from the analysis of 
empirical data from a cross-sectional survey. The empiricist will, however, 
face many problems if he wants to deduce certain consequences from this 
empirical fact.
Firstly, he cannot be sure that the relationship is a real one. Admittedly, 
he uses the basic rules of multivariate analysis to test whether or not the rela-
tionship is a true one by taking into account control variables. Actually, he is 
unsure that all relevant control variables have been taken into consideration in 
his analyses. Moreover, the assumption of a closing system of relations between 
variables is only a convenient fiction – the assumption allows us to suppose 
that exogenous factors (i.e. not controlled) are not simultaneously correlated 
with independent and dependent variables, but it does not tell us anything 
about the relevance of our choice of endogenous and exogenous variables. The 
ceteris paribus rule is itself no longer of any help.
Secondly, we should consider the case where data from a new survey show 
no correlation between the variables under study. If so, would we be allowed 
to conclude that these new data falsify this correlation? Certainly not! We 
therefore are in an undecidable situation.
Thirdly, the dependence between variables sometimes says nothing on the 
meaning of their relationship. Does the growth of education precede industria-
lisation? Or does the reverse hold? Should we rather suppose a retroaction effect 
between them? Here again, the empirical analysis does not allow us to decide.
Fourthly, if any modelling of the relationship between two phenomena 
(i.e. any identification of nomological invariance) is built on the basis of N 
observations, it is therefore possible to construct empirically not one but a very 
large number of mathematical “laws”. Can we empirically make sure that a spe-
cific law is valid? Certainly not! All those laws are empirically valid. Actually, 
we often apply the principle of simplicity to choose a model among all those 
which are theoretically possible. However, this principle is frequently violated 
for theoretical reasons. Suppose an empiricist wishes to study the relationship 
between the size of the family and suicide rate on the basis of data provided 
by Durkheim in Suicide. The first order linear regression model between the 
dependent variable (S) and the independent variable (F) provides an excellent 
fit which gives a value of R2=0.915 .
S = 1609.6 - 3.64 F
The linear regression model with a negative slope expresses the Durkhei-
mian proposition according to which when the density of the family increases, 
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the likelihood of suicide decreases. Such a result would satisfy the most deman-
ding empiricist. A more complex model is, however, preferred because it is 
deduced from the theory of integration, according to which when integration 
increases, the suicide rate decreases and then increases. This theoretically based 
proposition is expressed by a parabolic model. From the same empirical data, 
the estimated parameters are
S = 7515-34,051 F + 0,039 F2
In this case, the value of R2=0.97 is greater than that given by the first order 
regression. I am not saying that the parabolic model is better than the first-
order model on the basis of the value of R2. If the parabolic model “explains” 
a greater percentage of the variance than the linear one does, it is because it 
contains an additional parameter. Choosing a model rests on the sole theory 
and not on the results of analyses of empirical data.
The simplicity principle cannot be therefore a selection criterion. If we 
base our choice on numerous examples borrowed from the history of science, 
we will be inclined to believe that frequently the more complex model is pre-
ferable to the simplest one. A classic example is the astronomical theory that 
describes the motion of planets around the sun. Kepler’s ellipsoidal model is 
more complex than Copernicus’s circular model.
To explain the correlation and make it understandable, the empiricist is usua-
lly forced to construct hypotheses on the mechanisms that generate empirical 
regularity. In doing so, he is no more an empiricist. But this is a post hoc strategy 
of generative mechanisms. In general, what he calls interpretative assumptions 
at the end of his research are mostly ad hoc and cannot be generalised.
Let us borrow from Boudon (1973) a suggestive example of an ad hoc 
mechanism. Different studies have demonstrated that social mobility changes 
according to various factors such as the increase in school enrolment, econo-
mic development, the nature of stratification such as the presence of legally 
established strata in the past as states in Europe. Lipset and Zetterberg (1956) 
noted that, contrary to what was thought, the mobility rate was only very 
slightly different in Europe and in the United States. They tried to improve 
the theory by introducing the hypothesis of the existence of a mechanism that 
would explain why the aspiration to climb the social ladder is small. According 
them, this aspiration is especially low when social barriers are less visible: where 
social distinctions are imperceptible, the income inequality is low and the 
standard of living is high, and the individual does not seek to improve his/her 
social status. If the United States has a mobility rate similar to that in Europe, 
this is due to factors whose conflicting effects nullify each other: the United 
States has no legally defined social hierarchy as in Europe; it has a less visible 
stratification than in the old continent. The combination of greater ease and 
less aspiration to climb the social ladder therefore makes intelligible the relative 
uniformity of mobility rates between societies whose systems of stratification 
are different. We have here a rudimentary but good example of the use of a 
post hoc mechanism.
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As Boudon (1973) emphasises, the explanation being ad hoc, the only con-
sequence that can be drawn is the proposition itself it seeks to explain. Boudon 
does not claim that what he calls factor analysis can be of no help despite its 
limitations and weaknesses. He disqualifies it as a scientific research strategy 
insofar as its objective is to explain and to understand phenomena. The aim 
of research in the empiricist approach is to find a relationship between the 
“explicandum” and the “explanans” as in statistical analyses. In the most favou-
rable interpretation, this research strategy sometimes assumes the existence of 
a black box between the two variables that is either of no interest or difficult 
to observe, to decompose and to describe, as Bunge notes (1967). We will see 
later how the theory of rationality tries to avoid the existence of the black box 
in explaining phenomena.
Boudon goes further in his critique of factor analysis. He observes that 
whatever the degree of generality of the observed relations between variables, 
and assuming they are not spurious, they remain unintelligible and therefore 
offer no explanation insofar as we do not identify the generative mechanisms 
of phenomena and their co-occurrences, that is to say, essentially the reasons 
for actors’ behaviours. There are reasons that convert the power of the actor to 
perform actions. Actions are therefore only observable effects of reasons. Rea-
sons are not causes in Hume’s meaning; they are yet intrinsic traits of actions. 
They are logically related to actions. Of course, the positivist can always protest 
against the fact that reasons are empirically inaccessible and that they remind 
him of metaphysical entities. Actually, this argument is unconvincing since, 
like physicists and biologists, we accept that unobserved entities may be reques-
ted to explain, providing that their traces are empirically controlled.
In fact, identifying dependency relationships between phenomena is a 
particular and feeble case of nomological activity. Suppose that the socio-
logist points out invariant relations between phenomena, and that he can 
therefore subsume under laws the phenomena he is studying. According to 
Hempel’s (1965) deductive-nomological theory, a phenomenon is explained 
when one can deduce it from a general law and its particular antecedents. 
However, there are several general laws that do not explain the relationship 
between the phenomena they bind and do not make them comprehensible. 
One can recall many regularities in physics for instance. Consider the exam-
ples borrowed from Hempel (1965). Kepler’s laws describe well the path of 
the planets around the sun, but do not explain it. The ideal gas law PV = 
a T that links the pressure P, volume V and temperature T, specifies how 
each factor varies depending on the other two, but tells us nothing about the 
mechanisms that account for these relationships. The explanation was pos-
sible later with the kinetic molecular theory. The law is indubitably derived 
from the molecular theory; nevertheless, the explanation does not reside in 
this deduction. It lies in the fact that the macro-phenomena are caused by 
microscopic phenomena according to theoretically built mechanisms. We 
will see later that what is valid in physics and biology is valid in sociology 
or social sciences.
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It is clear that, according to the deductive-nomological model, to explain a 
phenomenon is solely to subsume it under laws and to deduce these laws from 
more general laws, exactly as required by Auguste Comte. It is true that this 
model does not justify the explanation by black boxes, but it certainly contrib-
utes to moving the scientist away from the search for generative mechanisms 
anathematised by Auguste Comte.
5. From generative mechanisms to a general theory of rationality
We are not always able to produce explanations without black boxes. When we 
use collective concepts or notions that we are unable to deduce from the struc-
tures of individual interactions, or when we ignore their mode of production, 
we can be assured that black boxes exist in the chain of reasons we give to make 
intelligible the phenomenon under study. How can we explain the behaviour 
of individuals in a crowd? How is it that “an assembly of harmless bourgeois 
can turn into a fearsome monster”, according to Durkheim’s (1897) famous 
phrase? For LeBon (1895), the individual undergoes a radical transformation 
in a crowd that makes the emergence of primitive and irrational elements 
possible. The person loses control of himself and behaves like an animal. The 
basic mechanism by which LeBon elucidates this behaviour is the “suggestion”, 
that is, accepted orders given to that person. The person is literally hypno-
tised. Why does the “primitive” believe in magic? For Lévy-Bruhl (1922), their 
magical beliefs are explained by the fact that they have the “primitive mental-
ity” different from the “civilised mentality”. Why do students from different 
social origins formulate different educational demands although they are of 
the same age, educational level and scholastic attainment? Why do working 
class students prefer lower-level education than upper-middle class students? 
To explain this correlation, let us suppose that the sociologist argues that it is 
because children are socialised differently or that they do not have the same 
“habitus”. Why do French social scientists produce more books than scientific 
articles compared to their American colleagues (Boudon, 1986; Cherkaoui, 
2011 for a systematisation and a generalisation of the market theory based on 
empirical data)? A possible answer is that France has a “cultural specificity”. 
“Suggestion”, “primitive mentality”, “socialisation”, “habitus”, and “cultural 
specificity” are black boxes insofar as we are unable to specify the mechanism 
that meets these vague notions.
How can we explain without black boxes, according to Boudon (1998a)? 
He distinguishes two types of explanation with mechanisms. The first one 
“gives the impression that the explanation is final” in the sense that our search 
ends. Being satisfied at least temporarily by the responses we give, we do not 
ask more questions. For the second one, the explanation does not seem to have 
exhausted all the questions that are likely to be asked. In some cases indeed, 
there are theories that use mechanisms but do not belong to the methodologi-
cal individualist paradigm, as in the example of the explanation of the demand 
for education by socialisation (or some macro-structural theories).
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Let us examine the example of crowd behaviour. Coleman (1990) shows 
that the structure of the game of this phenomenon is not comparable to that 
of the prisoner’s dilemma since, in crowds, there is communication between 
the actors. We cannot therefore assert that there is a dominant strategy, which 
would be running to the fire exit in the event of a fire in a theatre. He notes 
that the concepts of suggestion, contagion, and social facilitation can be inter-
preted in terms of “transfer of power.” In some situations indeed, the individ-
ual divests himself of the power or control he normally has of his own actions 
and transfers it to others. This interpretation has the advantage of making the 
action the result of an intentional act and allows us to ask the question why 
and in what circumstances the rational actor operates such a transfer. In addi-
tion, such a perspective can make the difference between groups; for example, 
between those who have potentially extremist behaviour and the others.
The behaviour of an assembly or a crowd in a closed space does not neces-
sarily result in panic; it depends on the initial action of the actors who have not 
transferred their power to others: if it is quiet, the subsequent actions will also 
be so. Suppose that player A knows that the other players act independently of 
his behaviour. In his interest, he should try to quickly leave the room because 
he knows that his action has no effect on the actions of others. If, however, A 
knows that his action has an effect on others, he knows at the same time that 
fleeing can result in a traffic jam whose costs will be very high for him and for 
others. Escaping would be beneficial for him only if he is next to a door. It is 
more advantageous for him than for the others to leave the room in order. If 
the actions of others depend entirely on his action, it is in his interest to dictate 
orders so that the evacuation takes place peacefully. The situation is different if 
he assumes that each of the other group members does not act independently 
of him but has transferred to him and to others partial control. A can estimate 
that it is his interest either:
1) to run to the exit regardless of what others do,
2) to try to go out calmly regardless of what others do,
3) to try to go out quietly firstly, and secondly matching his action to that of 
others. All this depends on the degree of power that others have transferred 
to him, the probability that they will run towards the exit, and the benefits 
actor A can gain from each situation. We find ourselves in a situation char-
acterised by the interdependence between actors, where an actor cannot 
define a rational strategy if he ignores the strategy of others.
Coleman’s explanation is satisfactory and temporarily ultimate for the fol-
lowing reasons:
1) It answers all our why-questions,
2) It takes into account all possible scenarios (fleeing, go out in order, etc.). 
Unlike the theory that seeks to explain the consequences of only one behav-
iour, such as bottling,
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3) It uses the same assumptions to account for all behaviours, contrary to 
the assumption according to which the actor is sometimes rational and 
sometimes irrational,
4) It generates the macro-phenomena from micro-social behaviours, that is 
to say behaviours of individuals that have the same properties but that are 
involved in different interaction structures.
The fact that the ultimate causes are related to individual decisions implies 
that the explanation by a social mechanism has been made in terms of the 
methodological individualist paradigm.
As a model that abstractly reproduces the phenomenon to be explained, the 
generative mechanism provides an interpretation in terms of individual beha-
viours. It considers the social actor as the sociological atom who is generally 
individual. It excludes structures and therefore any attempt to reify them, as 
Weber (1922b) taught us. The sociological explanation is intelligible because it 
refers to intentions, reasons or causes and consequences of the individual agent 
actions. But if the paradigm of methodological individualism is necessarily 
associated with the strategy of generative mechanisms, it is however not always 
easy to apply. In fact, according to the epistemological status of a particular 
research domain, it is sometimes difficult or even temporarily impossible to 
give an explanation at the individual level (see Cherkaoui, 2007).
Two options are open. In the first one, the most radical, the researcher 
refuses to take into consideration in any explanation macro-social phenomena 
or normative concepts that are not explained and reduced to their individual 
behaviours. In the second one, which is more flexible, one provisionally accepts 
these macro-phenomena. As elements of our explanation, norms, rules or ins-
titutions for example are provisionally accepted in this second option and 
rejected in the first one, even though both versions agree that these variables 
are an intended or unintended consequence of individual interactions or the 
result of the crystallisation of long historical processes that the researcher is 
not yet able to explain but should make intelligible later (Cherkaoui, 2007).
One can therefore understand why Boudon (1998a) draws attention to the 
fact that the methodological individualist paradigm offers no immunity against 
the presence of black boxes in a sociological explanation. It is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition. To be protected against any risk of infection, one 
should couple this paradigm with the assumption of rationality. If we want our 
explanation to be entirely satisfactory, we should express the ultimate causes 
in fully understandable individual actions, namely based on reasons. In other 
words, those social actors are not victim to any hidden and unconscious force 
(Boudon, 1979). Insofar as it is based on the assumption of rationality – such 
as the example of the explanation of collective behaviour borrowed from Cole-
man – the rational choice model guarantees against any explanation infected by 
black boxes. It leads to ultimate explanations that do not require any additional 
questions or whose contents cannot be substantially improved by adding new 
information produced outside its frame.
From positivism to generative mechanisms Papers 2014, 99/4 465
Boudon timely points out that in the rational choice model, “rationality” 
is defined by the cost-benefit operation or expected utility. It therefore cannot 
legitimately claim to generality, and is unable to be applied to the most diffe-
rent sociological phenomena. Boudon offers four critical examples. The first 
one concerns the demand for education mentioned above. The expected utility 
model is unable to give an account of the interaction effect between students’ 
social background, their level of academic attainment and their demand for 
further education. In contrast, Boudon’s (1973, 2007, 2010) cognitive theory 
is able to explain why the influence of students’ social class is even higher on 
demand whereas the academic achievement is lower.
The second one is related to the voting paradox to which Boudon (1997) 
devotes a full analysis. According to the rational choice model prediction, 
citizens should not vote to the extent that the costs of voting largely outweigh 
the benefits. Yet they vote. The third example focuses on what he calls “the 
overreaction paradox”. In many circumstances, the violent individual reaction 
to insignificant daily life events is disproportionate to the costs. Sometimes 
costs are immeasurable compared to profit, which is zero or negative. 
Finally, the fourth example, which is the most important, is related to 
the explanation of beliefs. In the last three cases, we are not forced to accept 
the heavy assumption of actors’ irrationality. We should simply question the 
claim to generality of rationality as supposed by the expected utility model. 
In addition, cognitive and normative statements as well as beliefs concer-
ning ends and not means are beyond the domain of validity of the rational 
choice model. This model can account for beliefs formally translated by the 
statement “X is good because X removes unwanted consequences” since in 
this proposition X refers to its consequences. But it does not apply to non-
sequential normative beliefs that have nothing to do with the consequences 
of X. When we say “X is good,” X does not refer to its possible consequences. 
Such statements refer to what Weber meant by “axiological” rationality or 
“Wertrationalität” opposed to “Zweckrationalität” or instrumental rationa-
lity that is mean-end rationality.
Boudon’s cognitive theory extends the notion of rationality and generalises 
it in order to integrate instrumental rationality, cognitive rationality and axio-
logical rationality. It is based on four assumptions. For the first one, actions, 
beliefs and attitudes are perceived by the actor as meaningful, that is to say, 
based on reasons. The other three specify the conditions under which the three 
types of rationality are applied. It should be noted that this theory does not 
apply to all actions and accepts the existence of a-or irrational actions in the 
meaning Weber (1913, 1922) gives to traditional and affectual behaviours (par-
ticularly emotional), two of the four types of actions with Zweckrationalität 
and Wertrationalität actions. But a good research strategy must first begin by 
identifying the reasons behind the action or belief and not by using the a-or 
irrationality hypothesis that could lead to an aporia.
By reconstructing the chain of the actor’s supposed reasons, social science 
proposes a theory that generates empirically testable propositions.
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The rational choice model becomes a special case of Boudon’s cognitive 
theory for different reasons. While offering the same epistemological benefits 
as the first, by for example allowing the construction of hypothetico-deductive 
and predictive models and explaining mean-end actions, Boudon’s theory is 
more general than the expected utility model that is unable to make intelligible 
non mean-end phenomena. If cognitive theory gives the impression that it 
is not as unified as the rational choice model, it is due to the diversity of the 
types of reasons it takes into account and which depends on the nature of the 
circumstances in which actions, beliefs and attitudes are taken in or adopted.
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